cvox je napisao:
ja ima jedno pitanje.....
Herzt je spomenuo u svom postu da je swabija bila na kolapsu ekonomski i da ju je on digao na noge...e sad mene interesuje kako je on to uspio?
Interesuje me kako je mogao napraviti onoliku silu od zemlje koja je bila pred kolapsom ekonomskim?
Nasao sam jedan text koji ce ti malo objasniti nacin na koji je on digao zemlju na noge... To je vec ekonomska prica na koju bi se mogli ugledati danasnji predstavnici vlasti u svetu... Problem je bio sto je Nemacka bila u velikoj dubiozi, uzimala je zajmove od USA, ali kako je i kod njih pocela velika depresija, nemacka je ostala bez para, a marka je bila totalno bezvredna... Pokrenuo je industriju i doveo do velikih ulaganja, spoji je javni i privatni sektor, dao uslove i kredite za razvoj... Pre svega je ulagao u vojnu industriju...
Citiraj:
The centerpiece was the Germany's Work Creation Program of 1933-1936, which preceded its rearmament program. German economic policies between 1930 and 1932 were brutally deflationary, and in 1933, Hitler was elected Chancellor out of the chaos.
The financing of Nazi economic recovery programs drew upon credit creation techniques already developed prior to Hitler's appointment as chancellor. What changed after 1933 was the government's willingness to create massive short term credit and the government's firm commitment to retire the debt created by that credit.
Hitler told German industrialists in May 1933 that economic recovery required action by both the state and the private sector. The government's role was limited to encouraging private sector investment, mainly through tax incentives. He expressed willingness to provide significant public funding only for highway projects. Investment was unlikely if consumer refused to spend their money, and Hitler understood that potential consumers need income to make purchases. To combat traditional German fear of the social consequences of appearing better off than their neighbors, Nazi propaganda would psychologically stimulate the economy and develop a lust for life among consumers. Hitler stressed on May 31. 1933 that the Reich budget must be balanced. A balanced budget meant reducing expenditures on social programs, because Hitler intended to reduce business taxes to promote needed investment. A large work program without deficit spending had to be financed outside of the Reich budget. Hitler resorted to "prefinancing" (Vorfinanzierung) by means of "work creation bills" (Arbeitsbeschaffungswechseln).
Under the scheme of "prefinancing" with work creation bills (WCBs), the Reich Finance Ministry distributed WCBs (3 months, renewable up to 5 years) to participating credit institutions and public agencies. Contractors and suppliers who required cash in order to participate in work creation projects drew bills against the agency ordering the work or the appropriate credit institutions. These credit institutions then accepted (assumed liability for payment of) the bills, which, now treated as commercial paper, could rediscount the bills at the Reichsbank (central bank). The entire process of drawing, accepting, and discounting WCBs provided the cash necessary to pay the contractors and suppliers. The Reich Treasury undertook to redeem these bills, one-fifth of the total every year, between 1934 and 1938, as the economy and tax receipts recovered. As security for the bills, the Reich Treasury deposited with the credit institutions a corresponding amount of tax vouchers (Steuergutscheine) or other securities. As the Treasury redeemed WCBs, the tax vouchers were to be returned to the Treasury. Nazi Party economic experts believed that credit creation for purposes of job creation posed no inflationary threat and that it would be a far more responsible policy than the more conservative approach of tax increases and balanced budgets. Redeeming WCBs would burden the 1934-39 Reich budget, but the decline in Reich expenditure for welfare support and other subsidies would more than off-set the redemption payments. The surplus would be used to reduce public debt and reduce taxes. There were legal, political and institutional restrictions unique to Germany on the scope of the Reichbank that virtually dictated resource to WCBs as a means of putting 6 million unemployed Germans back to work. But the principle of WCBs can be applied to China to combat unemployment.
During 1933, Hitler sought to reassure Germany's business leadership that Nazi rule was consistent with the preservation of the free market system, because he needed the support of the industrialists. He could buy that support by keeping wages down during the recovery, but any rigorous effort to curb prices and profits would alienate the business community and slow down economic recovery. Hitler sought to restore profitability to German business through reduced unit cost achieved by increasing output and sales volume, rather than through a general increase in prices (Mengenkonjunktur, niche Preiskonjunktur- output boom, not price boom).
Adoption of "performance wage" (Leistungslohn- payment on a price-rate basis) increased labor productivity, thereby driving costs down and profit up. Some upward price movements were permitted to adjust price relationships between agricultural and manufactured products and between goods with elastic and inelastic demands, also to prevent price war and below-cost dumping. These principles of "output boom, not price boom" and "performance wage" will also work for China.
Hitler saved the German farmers from their heavy debt burden through relief programs and through rising farm prices. This policy increased farm income at the expenses of the middlemen institutions and provided price subsidy for the consumers.
Hitler sought price stability only in sectors critical to the national economy and to the goal of rearmament. Germany had no price policy until the 1936 Four Year Plan which concentrated economic authority in the hands of Goring and put finally an end to free market policy. Business managers generally make investment and employment decisions based on their judgment of the prospect for new orders. The difference between Germany's economic recovery under Hitler and America's relative stagnation under Roosevelt in the early 1930s, was the relative probability of new orders for goods. Hitler made it clear that in the near future after 1936, a major rearmament program would make heavy demand on the nation's durable goods and capital goods industries. With that assurance German industry could expand with confidence. Roosevelt was unable to provide such "confidence" to industry and had to rely on anemic market forces.